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1. Introduction  
Since the early 1960s, tourism has become the principal engine of growth in the services 
sector in Spain. According to the Spanish Statistical Office, tourism accounted for 12.1% of 
GDP in 2003 and employed around 12% of the total workforce (and 19% of the service 
sector; see Guardia, 2004). It provides direct employment for over 860,000 people, rising to 
roughly 1.5 million workers when those employed in related activities are included 
(Corkhill et al., 2004).  
As many tourist activities are mainly seasonal, usually everybody assumes a direct link 
between the tourism industry and temporary and seasonal employment. In 2004, 32.8% of the 
sector’s employees were on temporary contracts in Spain, a figure which was slightly above 
the 31.2% national average, and four points larger than the service sector average of 28.4%. In 
fact, trade unions have called for greater job stability and less seasonal work in the tourism 
industry so as to achieve a service of greater quality (Jaimez, 2005). Thus, critics argue that the 
sustained growth in the tourism industry has been achieved at the expense of its workers. In 
spite of this, there have been surprisingly few attempts to evaluate the career progress in this 
industry, and, from our perspective, this is the main contribution of this chapter.  
Herein, we seek to contribute to the analysis of tourism employment by focusing on an 
important aspect of the use of temporary contracts in this industry: their pattern of 
promotion into open-ended contracts. In particular, we use a longitudinal administrative 
data source from the Spanish Social Security records (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, 
hereinafter MCVL) which tracks the labor careers of workers affiliated to the Social Security 
in 2005 (i.e., the sample is representative of working people in 2005 in Spain). The analysis of 
temp-to-perm transitions is carried out separately for workers in three different sub-
samples. The first one is constituted by individuals who have never been employed in the 
tourism industry along their labour market history; the second sub-sample is formed by 
individuals who have been employed for less than 50 percent of their labour history in the 
tourism industry; the last sub-sample is composed of individuals who have been employed 
in the tourism industry at least for half of their working history. The objective is, therefore, 
to measure mobility into permanent contracts, by tracking the work biographies of these 
three different subsets of individuals. We estimate an econometric model in which the 
worker faces the alternative of remaining in the same situation characterized by the absence 
of an open-ended contract versus moving to a permanent job. Our results show that when 
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individuals have been employed in the tourism industry for less than 50 percent of their 
working life, tourism experiences represent a springboard into open-ended contracts. On the 
contrary, when individuals are substantially engaged in the tourism industry along their 
working life (i.e., those hired in the industry for at least 50 percent of their working life), 
being hired on a temporary basis in this industry exerts a negative impact as regards their 
career aspirations: these individuals enjoy a lower likelihood of achieving subsequent open-
ended contracts. Thus, recursively working in the tourism industry —which is characterized 
by seasonality, a large proportion of part-time workers and high labour turnover— implies 
limited career opportunities.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the institutional context and briefly 
reviews previous literature. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 presents the 
empirical model and its main results. We conclude in Section 5.  
2. Temp-to-perm transitions and the tourism industry: Spanish institutional 
background and previous literature  
In general, the image of tourism employment appears to be split: on the one hand, tourism 
jobs possess a certain image of glamour —meeting people and travel are often seen as 
glamorous and attractive aspects of tourism employment. On the other hand, they are 
deemed as of low status and skill. In a sense, the positive aspects attributed to tourism 
employment compete in the image stakes with negative aspects such as low pay, service and 
menial status. Some of the major touristic businesses are dominated by unskilled and semi-
skilled jobs (Mathieson & Wall, 1982; Jafari et. al., 1990). The tourism employee is often seen as 
“uneducated, unmotivated, untrained, unskilled and unproductive” (Pizam, 1982, pp. 5). As 
regards Spain, the profile of a “typical” employee in hotels, catering and travel agencies is that 
of a woman aged 30 to 44 years-old with secondary education, whereas the profile of a typical 
restaurant employee is that of a woman aged 16 to 29 years-old with elementary education 
(Jaimez, 2005), although some authors stress the relevance of the simultaneity of hard-to-fill 
vacancies and skill shortages in the Spanish tourism industry (Marchante et al., 2006).  
Tourism employment is characterized by high levels of fluctuation in demand for its 
services and products, not only in terms of annual seasonality, but also within the timeframe 
of a week or day —indeed, there is an important literature on seasonality in tourism 
employment (see, e.g., Baum, 2007). This causes labour to be flexible and makes it, in labour 
market terms, unstable (Ball, 1989; Riley, 1991; Heerschap, 2004). As labour flexibility is at 
the very heart of tourism employment, it is worth debating whether or not this can be 
counted as an attractive aspect of the industry. Tourism has a high degree of seasonality, 
which can generate a dichotomy between core-periphery workers, with employees in the 
periphery holding temporary contracts. Given the seasonal and periodic variations in 
demand in tourism, seasonal (Ball, 1989) and part-time work is common in the industry 
(Jafari et. al., 1990; International Labour Office, 1989). In Spain, the phenomenon of 
temporary employment in tourism affects women (43.6%) more than men (30.9%), and 
people under the age of 30 (56.8%), and some Spanish regions (in particular, Andalusia has a 
temporary employment rate in tourism of 42%). Broken down by sub-sectors, we find that 
four out of every ten women employed in the hotel trade is hired on a temporary contract, 
this ratio dropping to three out of every ten for male workers. There is also a growing trend 
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of temporary contracts in the restaurants, cafes and bars sectors, accounting for 48.1% of the 
female workers and 39.9% of male ones (Spanish Labour Force Survey, INE).  
This predominance of seasonality and flexible working hours might harm career progress of 
workers in terms of reaching an open-ended contract compared to other economic sectors. 
The Spanish economy provides an interest context to contrast this hypothesis because Spain 
is the OECD country with the largest proportion of wage and salary workers hired on a 
temporary basis (around 30 percent since the beginning of the nineties). Although 
temporary contracts are widely used in the Spanish tourism industry (as we explained 
above), this type of contracts is extended to all economic sectors1. 
The extended use of temporary contracts in many sectors of activity in Spain began with a 
legal change introduced in the Workers’ Charter in 1984 aimed at decreasing the 
unemployment rate (at that time, the highest one in the OECD, above 20 percent). The main 
component of this labour market reform was to allow temporary and fixed-term contracts 
not only for temporary needs of the firm but also for permanent ones. Originally it was 
intended to increase hiring flexibility, but in fact it represented an increase in firing 
flexibility, because of the much lower firing costs of temporary contracts compared to open-
ended contracts. In very few years, the temporality rate rose from around 10 percent at the 
beginning of the eighties (Fina et al., 1989) to around 33 percent in 1992 (Toharia, 2006). Such 
high proportions of workers hired on a temporary basis created different problems for 
workers and even for firms and the economy as a whole (Toharia & Malo, 2002), such as 
higher working injury rates, lower levels of skills, decreases in the fertility rate, increasing 
difficulties faced by young people to obtain mortgages, relevant postponement of new 
families formation, and a segmented labour market. Different labour market reforms have 
been implemented in 1994, 1997, and 2006 in order to decrease the use of temporary 
contracts and to promote the conversion of these contracts into open-ended contracts. 
Theses reforms have not had a big short-term effect on the use of temporary contracts (in 
2007 the temporality rate remained at 31%), although the temporality rate has slightly 
decreased in the private sector2. 
Literature on transitions from temporary to permanent contracts mainly focuses on whether 
a ‘temporality trap’ exists or not. On the one hand, temporary employment may be a ‘trap’ 
of endless precariousness especially as duration in the temporary contract increases. First, a 
temporary contract may serve as a signal as to the lack of alternatives (especially in case that 
the employer believes that the temporary worker has already been screened by other 
employees). Second, due to the high turnover usually associated with fixed-term and 
temporary contracts, temporary work may be associated with limited acquisition of human 
capital (in the presence of a positive externality connecting specific to general human 
                                                 
1 Sometimes, the high temporality rate of Spain has been related to the relative importance of tourism 
industries and construction. However, Toharia (2006) and Malo & Mato (2006) show (applying shift-
share analysis) that the widespread use of temporary contracts is not related to the employment 
distribution by sectors and that, moreover, the evolution of the temporality rate is not linked to 
dynamic changes in the distribution of employment by industries. 
2 As Toharia (2005) explains the temporality rate in Spain has been high in the Public Administration at 
the local level, particularly in municipalities, possibly because local employment measures are strictly 
linked to the annual public budget and contracts can not go beyond this limit. Thus, some people are 
hired year by year by municipalities using different types of temporary and fixed-term contracts. 
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capital). Finally, as search intensity for an open-ended job is expected to decrease with the 
duration in the non-permanent state, the exit rate from a temporary to a permanent contract 
is expected to be negatively associated with such a duration.  
On the other hand, there are at least two reasons why temporary employment might 
represent a “springboard” to permanent employment (García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón, 2011). 
First, according to the matching approach, firms may use temporary contracts as a screening 
device in order to identify the best matches: in this case, more-able workers might signal 
their type by making themselves available for screening under temporary contracts. In this 
sense, workers who are able to find a temporary job provide a signal of their quality to 
potential employers, since being on a temporary contract means that the worker is willing to 
take a job (rather than, for instance, rely on unemployment benefits). Therefore, temporary 
job experience may be informative about the ability and motivation of the individual3. We 
would then expect that the rate of transition from a temporary contract to an open-ended 
contract would decrease as time goes by, since employers will use an individual’s labor 
market history to sort good workers from bad workers and they might perceive (rightly or 
wrongly) that a previous history of multiple temporary contracts is likely to result in some 
loss of skills. Secondly, following the human capital approach, being employed under a 
temporary contract allows the worker the acquisition of human capital (either general or 
specific) which would positively influence the probability of acquiring a permanent status 
—in addition to social contacts and information on permanent vacancies, which may allow 
the individual to deepen his attachment to the labor market, and to search more effectively 
for more desirable jobs4.  
Therefore, the way in which the accumulation of temporary jobs affects the probability of 
reaching an open-ended contract is an empirical question. Previous international literature 
shows results supporting both views. Hagen (2003) for Germany, Zijl et al. (2011) for the 
Netherlands, Gagliarducci (2005) for Italy, and Engelland & Riphahn (2005) find evidence 
on temporary contracts as bridges towards permanent employment. However, Booth et al. 
(2002b) for the UK, D’Addio & Rosholm (2005) for the European Union5 as a whole, and 
Blanchard & Landier (2002), find relevant negative effects of temporary employment on 
labour careers.  
Focusing on the Spanish case, the first empirical analysis (up to our knowledge) is Toharia 
(1996), who finds that seniority is a key variable to determine the transition from a 
temporary contract to a permanent one, because employers would be interested in using, at 
least for some workers, temporary contracts to screen for candidates to permanent jobs. 
Later, Alba-Ramírez (1998) shows that the likelihood of a temp-to-perm transition notably 
decreased from 1987 to 1995, especially for women, young people, males without studies 
and for those non-employed prior to their temporary contract. Again, seniority is a key 
                                                 
3 Indeed, some studies have shown that employers use atypical contracts as a way of screening for 
permanent jobs (Storrie, 2002; Houseman et al., 2003). 
4 However, as explained in the literature on career interruption (Mincer & Offek, 1982), unemployment 
spells following terminations of temporary contracts would make the individual incur not only the 
permanent loss of firm-specific human capital, but also the deterioration of general skills (Gregory et al., 
2001). 
5 They use the European Community Household Panel from 1994 to 1999. 
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variable to understand the transition toward an open-ended contract6. Recently, Toharia & 
Cebrián (2007) have provided wide empirical evidence explicitly focused on whether or not 
a temporality trap exists. They use different databases to analyze workers’ labour market 
trajectories. A distinctive feature of this research is that they analyze the patterns of 
(un)stability not only focusing on the transition towards an open-ended contract but also on 
the stability of the open-ended contracts too. They find that after a period of 7 seven years 
(from 1998 to 2004) 39 percent of temporary workers remain in a situation of vulnerability as 
regards the temporality trap. In addition, using a multivariate analysis they find that the 
strongest negative effect on the likelihood of being trapped is found for individuals with up 
to 5 contracts. For additional contracts, the effect remains negative up to 20 contracts, 
becomes zero between 21 to 39 contracts and positive for 40 or more contracts. These three 
studies use logit specifications, which may be not very flexible when applied to the analysis 
of the dynamic path of transition rates. Up to our knowledge, duration studies on Spanish 
conversion rates are those of Amuedo-Dorantes (2000), Güell and Petrongolo (2005), 
Casquel & Cunyat (2005) and García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón (2011). Amuedo-Dorantes 
(2000) estimates transitions out of temporary employment using Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
data from 1995:2 through 1996:2, and finds that conversion rates are very low, regardless of job 
tenure. Güell & Petrongolo (2007) use Labour Force Survey data from 1987:2 through 2002:4 to 
study the time pattern of permanent employment, and they find that conversion rates of 
temporary into permanent contracts increase with seniority. Casquel & Cunyat (2005) analyze 
whether the existence of observable and unobservable characteristics influences the transition 
rate to a permanent employment and conclude that in Spain temporary contracts do not play 
this role. García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón (2011) analyze temporary workers’ transitions into 
permanent employment for workers under 26 years-old. They find out that the conversion rate 
from temporary into permanent employment is very low, and that individuals with long 
unemployment duration flow into permanent work less frequently.  
Nevertheless, none of this previous research focuses on the employment in tourism 
industry, and this is one of the novelties of the present contribution. However, the instability 
of workers’ career in Spain is a worrying issue for policymakers. The main instrument 
provided by the institutional regulation is a special type of open-ended contract called 
‘discontinuous open-ended contract’ (in Spanish, contrato fijo discontinuo). It is an open-
ended contract which allows for interruptions of the labour relation because of seasonality. 
These interruptions (typically, in autumn and winter) are covered either by working 
elsewhere (for example, in construction) or by receiving public benefits for unemployment. 
In other words, when each tourist season ends, workers are laid off but they expect an 
implicit re-call by the same firm in the following tourist season. In the Balearic Islands, this 
contract is widely used in the tourism industry7 (see Toharia, 2005, for a wide report on 
workers hired using these contracts). Considering that the employment variation in the 
Balearic Islands is around 100,000 people, 40 percent is covered by these special open-ended 
                                                 
6 Using cross-section data from 2001 for Spain, García-Serrano (2004) shows that workers with 
temporary contracts suffer worse labour conditions and face a greater employment exit rate, especially 
those with tenure lower than 18 months. 
7 In other Spanish regions, as Murcia, this contract is also widely used for seasonal agricultural 
activities. 
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contracts whereas the remainder is covered by different types of temporary and fixed-term 
contracts. As regards earnings, Toharia (2005) concludes that the discontinuous open-ended 
contract is not harmful for these workers. In our analysis, we will not consider this contract 
as a special case, because we will focus on the first transition into an open-ended contract. 
However, any analysis trying to cover the whole trajectory of workers in the tourism 
industry in Spain should consider as a special case the perm-temp or perm-unemployment 
transitions from discontinuous open-ended contracts and the successive temp-to-perm 
contracts.  
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data and definition of sub-samples 
Our data set is a representative sample of all workers included in the Spanish Social Security 
records in 2005, and it is called Longitudinal Sample of Working Lives (in Spanish, Muestra 
Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL). For all these workers, the database includes information 
about their whole labour market trajectory, i.e., about every employment (and 
unemployment spell) along their work history (from the moment when they first enter the 
labor force up to the year 2005). Thus, it is a retrospective database not a panel. Because of 
this, every conclusion will apply to the Spanish working population in 2005. The variables 
included refer to the worker’s labor market trajectory and their individual characteristics, 
such as the reasons for the end of each contract, province, economic activity sector, type of 
contract, whether the contract was signed with a temporary help agency for each spell of 
employment, as well as age, gender, occupation, duration in employment and in 
unemployment. The duration of the employment spells are built from the dates of the hiring 
and the end of the contract and it is measured in months. In addition, for our analysis, we 
also consider two aggregate variables at the regional and national level: the growth rate of 
the domestic product (i.e., a control for the business cycle) and the regional unemployment 
rate (i.e., a control for the local labor market situation).  
From the initial database we filter out workers above 55 years-old, and select only 
individuals who had a temporary contract at least twice in the period analyzed, whose 
initial contract was of a temporary nature, and who have exclusively been working at the 
General System of the Social Security (i.e., we exclude self-employed workers).  
The analysis of temp-to-perm transitions in the tourism industry is only meaningful when 
we can compare it with the rest of economic sectors. As along their careers, workers can be 
hired by firms from different industries, we have divided the total sample into three groups: 
the first one is constituted by individuals who have never been employed in the tourism 
industry along their labour market history; the second group is formed by individuals who 
have been employed in the tourism industry for less than 50 percent of their labour history; 
and the third one is composed by individuals who have been hired in the tourism industry 
at least for half of their working history. Since the size of these groups is very large, we 
extracted random samples out of the first two —a 10% random sample of the individuals 
belonging to the first group, and a 20% random sample of the individuals belonging to the 
second group. The final group size is 12,847, 10,481 and 10,949 individuals in the first, 
second and third sub-samples, respectively.  
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For our analysis (and for reasons of simplification), we only focus on the first temp-to-perm 
transition (if any) of the working trajectory of individuals. For individuals never hired under 
a permanent contract, our sample includes all their employment spells (all of them under 
temporary contracts). For those who enjoy any temp-to-perm transition, we will consider 
their first open-ended contract (and, therefore, every temporary contract prior to this first 
observed open-ended contract). Finally, spells ending in 2005 may be censored. Therefore, in 
the econometric analysis the sample consists of spells of temporary contracts that can end 
up either in another temporary contract, in an open-ended contract, or are censored 
observations. In addition, when tenure in temporary contracts lasts beyond 40 months the 
observation is considered as censored (given the small number of observations beyond this 
duration), as well as individuals observed in the last temporary contract of their labour 
history.  
3.2 Variables  
We will consider different variables in order to control for both worker and job 
heterogeneity. We include controls for age, gender, nationality, qualification group (see 
Table 1), whether the contract is with a temporary help agency, and the employees’ activity 
sector. As indicated above, we also include some aggregate variables such as the growth rate 
of the gross domestic product and the regional unemployment rate. In addition, we control 
for the duration (in months) of the non-permanent state by including a second-order 
polynomial in log(t) —see section 4 below: the type of duration dependence might help 
understand the role of temporary contracts in the Spanish labour market. Finally, in order to 
gain flexibility in the specification of the duration dependence and to control for the role of 
institutional factors we also include several dummy variables that describe some specifics 
points in time: 6, 12, 18, 24 and 36 months. The first spikes are meant to capture short-run 
effects, while the longer ones are introduced to capture longer renewal dynamics for 
temporary workers which can be related to institutional factors (among other things).  
 
Skills Level Description of corresponding Social Security Contribution Groups 
High 1. ingenieros and licenciados - engineers and graduates 
2. ingenieros técnicos, peritos and ayudantes titulados - technical 
engineers and other skilled workers 
3. jefes administrativos and de taller - chief and departmental heads 
Upper 
Intermediate 
4. ayudantes no titulados - other semi-skilled workers 
5. oficiales administrativos - skilled clerks 
6.  subalternos - auxiliary workers 
Lower-
Intermediate 
7. auxiliares administrativos - semi-skilled clerks 
8. oficiales de primera and segunda - skilled laborers 
Low 9. oficiales de tercera and especialistas - semi-skilled laborers 
10. peones - unskilled laborers 
Note: These groups are proxies for workers’ skills level, because these categories are a mix of 
occupation and educational level required for jobs. 
Table 1. Aggregation of Social Security contribution groups into skills levels 
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Given that we want to test whether the type of the labour path influences the exit rate to a 
permanent contract, we also include a time dummy variable which collects the number of 
temporary contracts held by the individuals previous to the last observed employment spell. 
This last spell consists either of a permanent contract (for the case of uncensored observations) 
or a temporary contract (for censored observations). This variable allows quantifying the 
marginal effect of each new spell into the exit rate into permanent employment.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics at the time of the first temporary contract considered. In 
the no-tourism sub-sample, workers are predominantly males, while slightly more women 
are present in the remainder sub-samples. Workers in the “≥50%-tourism” sub-sample are 
slightly less likely to be under 45 years-old, although, on average, differences as regards age 
are not substantial on average among the three groups. In addition, while 10 percent of 
individuals belonging to the first sub-sample are hired via the intermediation of a 
temporary help agency, this only occurs for 6 percent of them in the third sub-sample. In 
addition, individuals in the first sub-sample are substantially more likely to have a high 
qualification level (as compared to the remainder groups) and to be working either in the 
financial institutions and business services or in the commerce sector. Note also how tenure 
in the first temporary contract considered is substantially larger in the first sub-sample 
(around 10 months) versus the other two (6 and 8 months, respectively). Table 4 shows the 
decomposition of the temporary contract types for each group considered. The following 
categories are taken into account: per task contract, casual contract, work-experience 
contract, training contract, interim contract, and a residual category (named as “Other”). See 
Table 3 for definitions for each type of temporary contract.8 
As can be observed, most of temporary contract spells are per task and casual contracts, 
while interim, work-experience and training contracts only account for a very small size of 
temporary contract spells. In particular, the former two categories constitute a marginal one 
in each sub-sample. Work-experience and training contracts are the ones having longer 
tenure, while interim, casual and per task are the shortest ones. Moreover, by looking at the 
first spell, the most remarkable finding is that the weight of the “Other” category 
substantially increases. As regards the “≥50%-Tourism” sub-sample, the per task contract 
category has a larger weight in the first spell considered when compared to the total number 
of spells (something which does not occur for the remainder two sub-samples). 
Finally, table 5 shows that at relatively short durations, temporary contracts are more likely 
to end up into another temporary contract. As duration proceeds, the probability of another 
temporary contract substantially reduces, while the chances of permanent employment 
increase (up to durations of 6 months)9. Therefore, the length of transitions from temporary 
contracts to open-ended contracts is longer than from temporary contracts into temporary 
                                                 
8 In order to know more details on each type of contract, see the Guía Laboral, elaborated by the 
Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, which is freely available in the following web page: 
http://www.mtas.es 
9 This table shows evidence of some temporary contracts continuing beyond the legal limit of three 
years. This may be attributed either to the fact that there may be imperfect compliance by employers 
shortly after the three-year limit, or measurement error (see, in this respect, Güell & Petrongolo, 2007).  
www.intechopen.com
 
The Dynamics of Temporary Jobs in the Tourism Industry 
 
41 
contracts. This may imply that employers generally use temporary contracts as a probation 
period and that “good” matches (in terms of renewal into open-ended contract or temporary 
contract) last longer.  
 
 No tourism < 50% in 
Tourism 
≥ 50% in 
Tourism 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Sex (Male=1) 0.528 0.499 0.482 0.500 0.475 0.499 
Age:       
Age 16-25 0.738 0.440 0.832 0.374 0.648 0.478 
Age 25-35 0.200 0.400 0.124 0.330 0.234 0.423 
Age 36-45 0.045 0.207 0.034 0.181 0.086 0.281 
Age > 45 0.017 0.130 0.010 0.101 0.032 0.177 
Temporary Hep Agency (1=Yes) 0.100 0.300 0.080 0.271 0.058 0.234 
Qualification level:       
High 0.077 0.267 0.015 0.120 0.016 0.126 
Upper-intermediate 0.098 0.297 0.087 0.282 0.093 0.291 
Lower-intermediate 0.260 0.439 0.233 0.422 0.281 0.449 
Low 0.565 0.496 0.666 0.472 0.610 0.488 
Inmigrant (1=Yes) 0.092 0.288 0.105 0.306 0.279 0.449 
Employer equal to previous one (1=Yes) 0.380 0.486 0.264 0.441 0.366 0.482 
Type of temporary contract:       
Per task 0.263 0.440 0.171 0.377 0.153 0.360 
Casual 0.315 0.465 0.364 0.481 0.467 0.499 
Work-experience 0.041 0.198 0.009 0.097 0.012 0.110 
Training 0.031 0.175 0.040 0.195 0.023 0.149 
Interim 0.045 0.208 0.019 0.138 0.024 0.154 
Other 0.305 0.460 0.396 0.489 0.321 0.467 
Activity:       
Agriculture, Fishing and Extractive 
industries
0.011 0.104 0.006 0.079 0.004 0.061 
Production 0.148 0.355 0.063 0.242 0.032 0.176 
Energy and Transport 0.013 0.115 0.010 0.101 0.007 0.086 
Construction 0.137 0.344 0.047 0.211 0.027 0.163 
Commerce 0.229 0.421 0.144 0.351 0.088 0.283 
Tourism - - 0.456 0.498 0.672 0.469 
Financial institute. & business services 0.271 0.444 0.177 0.382 0.119 0.324 
Public Administration 0.040 0.196 0.021 0.142 0.012 0.107 
Teaching and Health 0.075 0.263 0.024 0.154 0.014 0.116 
Other services 0.076 0.265 0.051 0.220 0.026 0.158 
Duration of first temporary contract spell  
(in months)* 
10.403 9.885 5.616 7.367 7.826 8.200 
No. Individuals 12,847 10,481 10,949 
Notes: (*) without taking into account censored observations. 
 
Table 2. Main descriptive statistics for the first temporary contract spell 
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 Work Contract Name Description 
Work-Experience (Practice) 
Contract 
(Contrato de prácticas) 
The purpose of this contract is to enable persons who have 
completed secondary, vocational training or university education 
to gain work experience according to their educational level. 
Training Contract 
(Contrato de formación) 
This contract is related to the provision of theoretical and practical 
knowledge required to perform a skilled job. This contract 
replaced the old apprenticeship contract in 1997. 
Interim Contract 
(Contrato de interinidad) 
This temporary contract is related to interim situations in the firm 
Per-task Contract 
(Contrato de obra o servicio) 
This contract was introduced for temporary needs of the firms 
related to specific works or services of unknown duration (but 
presumably not permanent). 
Casual Contract 
(Contrato eventual por 
circunstancias de la producción)
This contract is related to unusual or seasonal circumstances of 
the goods markets and excess of work in the firm. 
Table 3.  Description of Work Contract Denominations Used in the Analysis 
 
 n. of spells % Mean length % in first spell 
No tourism  
Type of contract     
Per task 29,481 35.88 4.140 (3.483) 26.27 
Casual 27,984 34.06 2.923 (2.749) 31.51 
Work-experience 1,693 2.06 10.709 (10.469) 4.09 
Training 753 0.92 8.422 (8.420) 3.14 
Interim 8,721 10.61 2.389 (1.915) 4.52 
Other 13,538 16.48 5.653 (5.234) 30.46 
<50% in Tourism
Type of contract     
Per task 25,804 27.31 2.885 (2.575) 17.10 
Casual 44,007 46.57 2.302 (2.177) 36.45 
Work-experience 653 0.69 9.914 (9.106) 0.94 
Training 883 0.93 6.192 (6.204) 3.97 
Interim 6,519 6.90 1.881 (1.628) 1.95 
Other 16,624 17.59 3.719 (3.608) 39.60 
≥ 50% in Tourism
Type of contract     
Per task 10,099 8.00 4.880 (4.1855) 15.33 
Casual 29,670 52.89 3.655 (3.4437) 46.68 
Work-experience 414 0.74 10.789 (10.580) 1.22 
Training 443 0.79 8.0744 (8.0744) 2.27 
Interim 2,826 5.04 2.6535 (2.1591) 2.43 
Other 12,648 22.55 5.500 (5.1572) 32.07 
Note: sample size is  12,847 individuals, 10,481 individuals and 10,949 individuals for the “No-tourism”, 
the “<50%-Tourism” and the “≥50%-Tourism” sub-samples, respectively.Every individual’s first spell is 
temporary. “Median length” measured in months, in parentheses for complete spells only. 
Table 4. Temporary contract spells composition by sub-samples 
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 No tourism 
Spell Length: TC-TC TC-PC 
 n. % n. % 
≤1 43,707 63.05 1,604 25.46 
>1 & ≤3 9,763 14.08 1,071 17.00 
>3 & ≤6 7,501 10.82 1,306 20.73 
>6 & ≤12 5,522 7.97 1,220 19.37 
>12 & ≤18 1,314 1.90 440 6.99 
>18 & ≤24 823 1.19 406 6.45 
>24 & ≤30 262 0.38 95 1.51 
>30 & ≤36 240 0.35 137 2.17 
>36 191 0.28 20 0.32 
Total: 69,323 100.00 6,299 100.00 
Censored 6,548 
 <50% in Tourism 
Spell Length: TC-TC TC-PC 
 n. % n. % 
≤1 57,690 68.67 2,134 39.42 
>1 & ≤3 11,972 14.25 1,041 19.23 
>3 & ≤6 8,015 9.54 1,053 19.45 
>6 & ≤12 4,680 5.57 799 14.76 
>12 & ≤18 885 1.05 184 3.40 
>18 & ≤24 423 0.50 122 2.25 
>24 & ≤30 138 0.16 29 0.54 
>30 & ≤36 119 0.14 45 0.83 
>36 87 0.10 7 0.13 
Total: 84,009 100.00 5,414 100.00 
Censored: 5,067 
 ≥ 50% in Tourism 
Spell Length: TC-TC TC-PC 
 n. % n. % 
≤1 23494 52.03 2,102 26.31 
>1 & ≤3 7465 16.53 1,403 17.56 
>3 & ≤6 7,463 16.53 2,013 25.20 
>6 & ≤12 5,200 11.52 1,655 20.72 
>12 & ≤18 710 1.57 335 4.19 
>18 & ≤24 384 0.85 289 3.62 
>24 & ≤30 143 0.32 63 0.79 
>30 & ≤36 146 0.32 116 1.45 
>36 146 0.32 13 0.16 
Total: 45,151 100.00 7,989  
Censored 2,960 
 
Table 5. Length of spell (in months) by type of transition  
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A preliminary analysis using non-parametric estimation of the hazard rates provides the 
time profile of the empirical hazard of the exit from a temporary to an open-ended contract 
(Figure 1). It shows the monthly empirical hazard functions from a non-permanent position 
for each sub-sample (Kaplan-Meier estimates). These empirical hazard functions collect the 
proportion of individuals leaving the temporary contract state at each moment in time, 
given that they have been temporarily employed until that moment (Lancaster, 1990). The 
figure shows, in the first place, long durations in non-permanent positions. In the second 
place, the probability of getting an open-ended contract remains basically flat, i.e, reaching a 
permanent contract is not related with the duration of the previous temporary contract. 
Therefore, the descriptive empirical evidence does not support the existence of a temporality 
trap level (in any of the three considered groups). Moreover, although the time profile is the 
same for the three groups, the rate is higher for those who have been working in this 
industry for at least fifty-percent of their working life (especially during the first twelve 
months), while the difference with respect to the other two sub-groups decreases with the 
duration of the temporary contract. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that there are several periods where the empirical hazard is 
noticeably higher than at surrounding periods: the hazard rates rise to peaks at tenure 
durations multiple of six (months 6, 12, 24 and 36). These peaks show that temporary 
contracts are very likely to finish at each of these particular months. Given that no special 
reason can be adduced to explain why individuals should be dismissed at those months 
multiple of six, these duration effects are likely due to temporary contract terminations. 
Similar results are obtained in previous studies (see, in particular, García-Pérez & Muñoz-
Bullón, 2005, or Güell & Petrongolo, 2005).  
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Fig. 1. Exit rate to an open-ended contract (Kaplan-Meier), by sub-samples. 
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4. Econometric approach: Discrete time duration analysis 
The exit rates from employment are analysed using discrete hazard model techniques —see 
Allison (1982) or Jenkins (1997), for a survey. The hazard rate out of employment into a 
permanent contract may be defined as the limit of the conditional probability of a transition 
taking place in a small interval dt after time t if no transition occurs until t, when that interval 
approaches to zero. Formally, let Ti be the length of individual i's temporary contract spell. 
Then the hazard for individual i at time t, hi(t), is defined by the following equation:  
 { }i ii 0 0 iPr(t dt T t¦T t)(t , ( ), ) lim (t)exp X (t)'
dt
i i i dt ih X t θ λ β θ→ + > ≥ ≥= =  (1) 
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function which may take either a parametric or a non-
parametric form; Xi(t) is a vector of time-invariant and time-varying covariates for 
individual i, β is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, i=1…N are individual-
month observations, and, finally, θi captures unobserved individual characteristics that 
affect the hazard in theory but are unobservable in the data, such as  acquired skills, 
attitudes, motivation, inherent ability and so on.  
Now, we define the probability of surviving through any interval dt after having survived 
the preceding j interval as (1-hij). Therefore, the likelihood contribution of individuals who 
exit into a permanent contract in the j-th interval is10: 
 [ ] i
i
t 1
i t j
j 1
Pr T t h (1 h )
−
=
= = −∏  (2) 
and if we assume that censoring takes place at the beginning of intervals, the likelihood 
contribution of individuals who find another temporary contract (or are artificially 
censored) at the start of the jth interval is:  
 [ ] i
t
i j
j 1
Pr T t (1 h )
=
> = −∏  (3) 
Then, defining di=1 if individual i's spell ends in a transition to a job (0 otherwise), the 
likelihood contribution of the i's individual can be written as:  
 [ ] [ ]i id 1 di i i iPr(T t ) Pr(T t )iL − = = >  =
i
i
d
t 1
ti j
j 1
h (1 h )
−
=
  
−   
∏
i
i
1 d
t
j
j 1
(1 h )
−
=
  
−   
∏  (4) 
where the discrete time hazard in the jth interval for each individual is:  
 j i j ih 1 exp exp(  X (t) γ (t) )β θ = − − + +   (5) 
A common but restrictive approach consists of specifying a parametric form for the baseline 
hazard (γt(t)). This approach is rather strong, given that the assumptions over the form are 
                                                 
10 We omit t, X and θ to simplify notation. 
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difficult to justify from an economic point of view, and provokes a misspecification 
problem. Instead of this, duration dependence is captured through the additive term γj(t), 
which is estimated in the most general way as possible through the inclusion of a second-
order polynomial in log(t)11. This method presents the advantage of being flexible and it is 
very common in the literature (see García-Pérez, 1997; García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón, 2005). 
A common distribution used for unobserved heterogeneity is the gamma distribution 
(Meyer, 1990). It can be shown that when θ is gamma distributed with unit mean and 
variance σ2, the log-likelihood function is as follows (Meyer, 1990, pp. 770)12:  
 ( ) ( )
2 2
1
2 ' 2 '
1 1 1
log log 1 exp ( ) 1 exp ( )
i it tn
ij j i ij j
i j j
L X t d X t
σ σ
σ β γ σ β γ
− −
− −
−
= = =
     
= + + − + +            
    (6) 
where γ(t) is a function that describes duration dependence in the hazard rate through the 
inclusion of a polynomial in log(t); and di is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if individual 
i´s spell ends in a transition to employment and 0 otherwise (censored observations). In the 
next section we estimate this likelihood function by maximum likelihood to ascertain which 
personal, job and labour market characteristics influence the duration of spells of temporary 
contracts that end either in an open-ended or in another temporary contract.  
5. Results: The transition rate into permanent employment  
Table 6 reports the results obtained from an estimation of the hazard rates for each sub-
sample13. Censoring (as explained earlier) takes place when some individuals are not 
observed prior to failure. In the present case, the data are right-censored because we do not 
observe the transition out of temporary employment for some individuals in the sample 
(they either continue at their current temporary job or enter a new temporary job). 
Moreover, as commented in Section 3.1, we have created an artificial right-censoring beyond 
40 months, due to the scarcity of observations beyond this duration. Therefore, the hazard 
model is used to examine the likelihood that workers exit temporary employment and enter 
permanent employment (versus entering a new temporary job or continuing at the current 
temporary job). Since Kaplan-Meier estimates for the employment hazard indicate that the 
likelihood of exiting from employment is significantly higher at the sixth, twelfth, twenty-
fourth and thirty-sixth months14 (see Section 3.3), the specification of the hazard rate includes 
dummy variables indicating whether or not the individual is on-the-job at such months15. 
 
                                                 
11 This polynomial offers the best results in terms of significance and likelihood values. 
12 The choice of a gamma distribution is made for computational reasons, which, however, could be 
debatable (Narendranathan & Stewart, 1993). Alternatively, the distribution could be approximated 
non-parametrically (Heckman & Singer, 1984).  In this case, we would follow a semi-parametric 
approach based on Heckman & Singer (1984), and we would assume that unobserved heterogeneity 
followed a discrete distribution function with different mass points.  
13 Though not shown, separate estimations by gender have also been obtained. They are available from 
the authors upon request. 
14 Other studies (see, for instance, García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón, 2005) also show evidence in this respect. 
15 The ratio of the hazard rate of an individual with a dummy variable equal to 1 to the hazard rate of 
the reference is exp(b). The percentage of increment (detriment) in the hazard rate is calculated as 
(exp(b)- 1)*100.  
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No tourism ≥ 50% in Tourism < 50% in Tourism 
 Coef. Std. Signif. Coef. Std. Signif. Coef. Std. Signif. 
Log(t) -0.567 0.109 *** -0.971 0.120 *** -0.139 0.204  
Log(t)2 1.089 0.090 *** 1.859 0.102 *** 2.626 0.248 *** 
Month 6 1.163 0.063 *** 0.924 0.059 *** 1.011 0.114 *** 
Month 12 1.310 0.078 *** 1.303 0.101 *** 1.119 0.147 *** 
Month 18 0.819 0.121 *** 0.949 0.155 *** 1.003 0.283 *** 
Month 24 2.598 0.113 *** 2.924 0.165 *** 3.030 0.298 *** 
Month 36 3.051 0.208 *** 3.115 0.271 *** 3.246 0.506 *** 
Sex (1=male) -0.211 0.123 * 0.093 0.138  -0.066 0.258  
Age:          
Age 16-25 - - - - -  - - - 
Age 25-35 0.305 0.120 *** 0.075 0.145  -0.335 0.264  
Age 36-45 -0.079 0.266  0.287 0.235  0.311 0.630  
Age > 45 0.322 0.412  0.364 0.350  1.747 1.263  
Qualification level:          
High -0.069 0.197  0.367 0.377  0.028 0.495  
Upper-intermediate 0.416 0.138 *** -0.347 0.162  0.016 0.226  
Lower-intermediate 0.382 0.103 *** -0.135 0.103  0.053 0.155  
Low - - - - -  - -  
Inmigrant -0.208 0.226  0.386 0.175  0.059 0.457  
Regional 
unemployment rate 
(tvc) 
-0.036 0.012 *** -0.159 0.015 *** -0.089 0.022 *** 
Quarterly growth GDP 
(tvc) 
-0.025 0.021  -0.046 0.025 * -0.023 0.039  
Employer equal to 
previous one 
-0.331 0.085 *** -0.018 0.087  -0.834 0.132 *** 
Activity:          
Agriculture. Fishing and 
Extractive industries
-0.048 0.366  -0.519 1.033  -1.334 0.998  
Production - - - - - - - -  
Construction -0.791 0.181  0.461 0.360  0.069 0.414  
Commerce 0.335 0.139 *** 0.152 0.283  0.431 0.299  
Tourism - - - -0.603 0.252 ** 0.618 0.277 ** 
Energy and Transport 0.066 0.346  -0.737 0.647  0.484 0.613  
Financial institutions 
and business services
0.240 0.154  0.268 0.294  0.286 0.333  
Public Administration -1.016 0.285 *** 1.055 0.553 * -0.376 0.747  
Teaching and Health -0.552 0.225 ** 0.214 0.472  -0.290 0.497  
Other services 0.068 0.194  0.258 0.348  0.688 0.383 * 
Table 6. Estimation results for discrete-time model of transitions from a temporary contract 
to an open-ended contract, by sub-samples (controlling for unobserved heterogeneity) 
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 No tourism ≥ 50% in Tourism < 50% in Tourism 
 Coef. Std. Signif. Coef. Std. Signif. Coef. Std. Signif. 
Number of previous 
Contracts: 
      
One contract - - - - - - - -  
2-5 contracts -0.506 0.086 *** -0.103 0.092 0.621 0.178 *** 
6-10 contracts -1.051 0.158 *** -0.494 0.182 *** 0.647 0.309 ** 
>10 contracts -1.267 0.222 *** -0.308 0.282 -0.121 0.394  
Type of contract:       
Per task -0.246 0.192  -0.933 0.237 *** -0.183 0.358  
Casual 0.284 0.184  -0.465 0.220 ** -0.095 0.347  
Work-experience -0.615 0.261 ** -2.960 0.494 *** -1.249 0.669 * 
Training -1.474 0.394 *** -1.595 0.447 *** -0.975 0.549 * 
Interim - - - - - - - - - 
Other -0.573 0.200 *** -1.214 0.236 *** -0.679 0.364 * 
Temporary Help Agency 0.119 0.154  -0.249 0.227 0.117 0.279  
Region:       
Andalucia -0.936 0.235 *** 0.258 0.283 -0.526 0.472  
Aragon -1.145 0.370 *** -0.981 0.439 ** -1.416 0.677 ** 
Asturias -1.307 0.406 *** -0.447 0.421 -0.679 0.710  
Balearic Islands -0.054 0.423  -2.093 0.303 *** -2.146 0.577 *** 
Canary Islands -0.523 0.287 * -0.702 0.262 *** -0.602 0.513  
Cantabria -1.256 0.550 ** 0.231 0.543 0.153 0.906  
Castilla la Mancha -0.508 0.293  -0.013 0.446 -0.427 0.631  
Castilla León -0.711 0.276 *** 0.330 0.337 0.002 0.595  
Catalonia -0.229 0.177  -0.743 0.224 *** -0.417 0.343  
Valencia -0.556 0.212 *** -0.802 0.263 *** -1.137 0.411 *** 
Extremadura -0.546 0.447  0.620 0.702 -0.873 1.079  
Galicia -1.751 0.282 *** -0.443 0.332 -0.556 0.573  
Madrid - - - - - - - - - 
Murcia -0.044 0.353  -0.874 0.514 * -1.895 0.797 ** 
Navarra -0.625 0.464  -0.949 0.678 -1.756 1.190  
Basque Country -0.892 0.279 *** -0.030 0.347 -1.359 0.675 * 
La Rioja 0.145 0.576  -0.648 0.659 2.128 1.782  
Constant -2.549 0.327 *** 0.714 0.445 * -0.500 0.666  
Gamma variance 17.926 1.591 *** 20.048 1.165 *** 62.170 6.006 *** 
χ2 (Prob> χ2) 24958.4 (0.000) 29712.5 (0.000) 28527.9 (0.000) 
Observations  
(indiv.-spell) 
325,735 242,858 261,819 
Log Likelihood function 16,770.34 18,608.968 -11,267.143 
Notes: Regressions also include dummies for each month of beginning each temporary employment spells 
(dummy variables for January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August and September-October). 
“tvc” means time varying covariate. Source: Social Security records, except for the regional unemployment 
rate and the quarterly GDP growth rate (which have been obtained from the Spanish Labour Force Survey, 
EPA). χ2 statistics refers to testing model with unobserved heterogeneity against that without. *** indicates 
significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%. 
Table 6. Cont. 
www.intechopen.com
 
The Dynamics of Temporary Jobs in the Tourism Industry 
 
49 
Given that our main interest is on the impact arising from the tourism industry on the 
likelihood of achieving permanent contracts, we have included a set of dummies which 
collect the activity sector where the individual is employed under the temporary contracts 
considered16. For workers in the ≥50%-tourism sub-sample, the most notable result is the 
fact that the tourism industry experience implies a substantial detrimental effect on the 
transition into a permanent contract, a decrease in the hazard rate of 45.3 %, respect to the 
remainder sectors (with the exception of Public Administration). Individuals with less than 
50% of their labour history in the tourism industry enjoy a higher likelihood of achieving a 
permanent job when the temporary contract is in the tourism industry (an increase of 85.5% 
in the hazard ratio) compared with the remainder sectors (with the exception of the residual 
group of ‘Other services’). Therefore, a tourism temporary contract might be either 
beneficial or detrimental, depending on the degree of attachment of the workers’ career to 
such an industry: for those with a weaker attachment, such an experience will serve as a 
‘springboard’ into permanent employment, whereas for those heavily engaged in tourism 
will be a substantial difficulty for moving into a permanent position.  
It is important to notice that individual background previous to the current temporary 
contract spell is relevant for explaining the transitions across labor careers and it is a good 
approach to determine whether a ‘temporality trap’ exists or not. In particular, for the non-
tourism group, the chance of transiting into a permanent job reduces as the number of 
previous contracts is larger (-39.7% for 2-5 previous temporary contracts, -65% for 6-10 
contracts, -71.8% for more than 10 contracts). This negative effect also appears in the ≥50%-
tourism sub-group, although it is only significant for having 6 to 10 previous temporary 
contracts (a decrease in the hazard rate of 39%). Therefore, the results show the existence of 
a temporality trap for non-tourism workers and a ‘partial’ trap for those with a working 
career mainly developed in the tourism industry. On the contrary, experiences of several 
previous temporary contracts exert a positive significant influence on the likelihood of 
transiting into a permanent job in the <50%-tourism sub-sample, up to a total of ten 
previous contracts (an increase in the hazard rate of 86.1% for 2-5 contracts and of 91% for 6-
10 contracts). Again, we find a positive effect of temporary contracts on their prospects of 
reaching a permanent job for those occasionally engaged in tourism.  
The variables for tenure in temporary contracts (6, 12, 18, 24, and 36 months) have a positive 
and very significant effect on the hazard rates, independently of the sub-sample considered. 
Therefore, as expected, temporary contracts are more likely to end at integer monthly 
durations. An eventual interpretation is that firms may be converting temporary contracts 
into permanent ones, once the legal limit for the temporary contract has been reached. 
Moreover, the hazard at durations multiple of six is higher for individuals who have been 
employed for more than half of their working history in the tourism industry than for the 
sub-group where individuals have been employed in this industry for at least 5 percent of 
their working lives. The fact that the time pattern of transitions into permanent contracts is 
                                                 
16 Of course, for the group of workers never hired in the tourism industry the set of industry dummies 
of the temporary contract does not include tourism. For those individuals without experience in the 
tourism industry along their work history, holding a temporary contract in the commerce, in 
agriculture, in the fishing or extractive industries or in the financial institutions and business services 
sectors, makes them enjoy a higher likelihood of entering regular employment than in the production 
sector. On the contrary, worse expectations as regards the exiting from temporary positions arise in 
construction, public administration and in teaching and health activities. 
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lower for those with a higher attachment to the tourism industry may imply either that the 
latter tend to occupy less productive job matches (which are thus less likely to be converted 
into permanent ones before the legal limit) or that they are in a weaker bargaining position 
than individuals in other industries, as they may be more easily replaced.  
However, when the employer in the current temporary contract is the same as in the 
previous one, the probability of reaching an open-ended contract decreases, -28.2% for non-
tourism workers, and -56.6%for the <50% -tourism sub-sample. These results show that 
employers do not use temporary contracts as screening devices when they subsequently hire 
the same workers through temporary contracts. Nevertheless, results do not show this effect 
for the >50%-tourism sub-sample.  
One might expect that workers who accept a temporary job are initially strongly attached to 
that job, for instance, for contractual reasons. In some sense, this is true, since the negative 
estimated effect for duration dependence is reversed as tenure in the temporary job 
increases. In particular, the predicted transition into regular employment slightly increases 
after a period of ten months  (a similar finding is obtained by Zijl et al., 2011). This effect 
applies to the three sub-samples of workers: the probability of finding a permanent contract 
decreases during the initial months of temporary employment, but increases thereafter. 
Thus, temporary employment duration initially presents a temporary penalty effect, since 
this negative impact disappears for long enough employment durations. A likely 
interpretation for this result is that sufficiently long experiences of employment increase 
worker’s human capital, and this fact may help her find a permanent job (compared to 
workers whose tenure in temporary employment is shorter). Apparently, employers may 
prefer individuals who have occupied a temporary job for time enough, given that this may 
constitute a positive signal. An increasing size of the social network among temporarily 
employed workers may also explain this. In addition, as the temporary contract goes on, 
given its fixed-term nature, the worker may increase search intensity. This may also explain 
the observed positive effect on the job finding rate.  
For a female temporary worker the probability of achieving a permanent contract does not 
significantly differ from that of men either in the ≥50%-tourism group or in the <50%-
tourism sub-sample, while they are in a disadvantaged position (relative to men) in the non-
tourism group. Age has a positive effect on the likelihood of transiting from temporary 
contracts into an open-ended contract, though only for the 25 to 35 age category in the no-
tourism sub-sample. Thus, individuals in the 25-35 age groups are more likely to enter into 
permanent employment. Probably, these workers have more firm-specific human capital 
than the youngest ones, which is highly valued by employers. In addition, it is a fact that 
younger workers are more willing to move from jobs (and employers) for improving their 
job match, even though this may imply an experience of unemployment, and eventually 
settling in a more stable career path (Jensen et al., 2003). In addition, the type of temporary 
contract held in the temporary contract spell is another relevant determinant of the 
transitions. Having an interim contract increases the probability of achieving a permanent 
contract. On the other extreme, we find training and work experience contracts, which 
present a detrimental effect on the movement into regular employment.  
As regards macroeconomic conditions, out of a temporary contract spell, the unemployment 
rate has a negative impact on the transitions into an open-ended contract. Thus, when the 
unemployment rate is high, firms can keep on searching for better employees and so the 
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probabilities that a worker is renewed or converted into a permanent job are lower. Lower 
unemployment implies better outside opportunities for temporary workers in search for 
better jobs, and this enables them to more credibly threat their employer in case of low 
conversion rates. On the contrary, the effect of the GDP growth rate is mostly non-
significant. There are some differences as regards the region of residence. In the no-tourism 
sub-sample, compared to Madrid, it is workers in Galicia, Cantabria, Asturias and Aragon 
who are substantially less likely to achieve a permanent contract. On the contrary, in the 
remainder groups, Balearic Islands is the region where exiting from employment into 
regular work is more difficult (which is one of the most important regions as regards 
tourism employment), closely followed by Murcia and Valencia (where tourism is very 
relevant too). Anyway, being in the Balearic Islands heavily decreases the probability of 
transiting towards a permanent employment either for those with a large or weak 
attachment to the tourism sector (in both cases, the hazard rate decreases by around 88%). 
Finally, one should note that the size of the gamma mixture distribution relative to its 
standard error suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is significant in this dataset. Thus, 
unobserved individual heterogeneity would be a serious concern without the 
methodological approach of this econometric estimation.  
6. Conclusion 
While academics and tourism planners have recognized that community involvement in 
tourism is essential —and, as a result, tourism is promoted in policy agendas on the grounds 
that it will enhance the lives of local people— limited attention has been paid to the stability 
of the jobs created in this sector. This article has addressed the relative neglect (as compared, 
for example, with infrastructure, transportation or marketing) of career progress in the 
tourism industry. In particular, we have investigated how temporary contracts affect the 
transition rate into permanent employment in Spain. Our focus has been especially placed 
on a comparison between a sub-group of individuals with a large attachment to the tourism 
industry (more than the 50% of the working career in tourism) versus two other sub-groups 
where this attachment is either non-existent or low (strictly zero and below 50%, 
respectively). For this purpose, we have applied single-spell duration techniques to a 
longitudinal data set of temporary workers obtained from Social Security records, which is 
representative of Spanish working population in 2005 (and, therefore, the information about 
working lives is retrospective). We have focused our analysis on the transition (if any) to the 
first open-ended contract of all individuals for the three described sub-samples.  
Two main conclusions from the data analysis are drawn. First, for those individuals with a 
weaker attachment to the tourism industry (below the 50 percent of their working career) a 
temporary contract in the tourism industry increases around 85% the likelihood of obtaining 
an open-ended contract, while for those with at least 50 percent of their working career in 
tourism a temporary contract in the tourism industry decreases the same probability by 45 
percent. Therefore, temporary contracts in tourism are not harmful for career stabilization 
prospects when working in tourism industry is occasional but it is clearly detrimental when 
the worker is very linked to this economic sector.  
Second, the analysis supports the existence of a ‘temporality trap’ for Spain (in this line see 
Güell & Petrongolo, 2007, García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón, 2011, or Toharia & Cebrián, 2007): 
even though transitions into permanent employment increase with tenure, temporary jobs 
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do not constitute stepping stones towards permanent employment since the probability of 
obtaining a permanent job decreases with repeated temporary jobs. However, this result 
depends on the relative attachment to specific sectors (here, the tourism industry) of the 
working careers of individuals. For those workers with an occasional engagement in the 
tourism industry, temporary contracts (and even accumulating temporary contracts) are, on 
the contrary, ‘springboards’ towards open-ended contracts.  
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